THE WRITINGS OF JOHN BALGUY

INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION

ZUR ERLANGUNG DER DOKTORWÜRDE
DER HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FAKULTÄT DER
FRIEDRICH-ALEXANDERS-UNIVERSITÄT ERLANGEN

VORGELEGT VON

HUGH DAVID JONES
AUS CHWILOG

ACAD. LUGD. BAT. BIBL.

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 22. Juli 1907

LEIPZIG
QUELLE & MEYER
1907.

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To

PROF. D$^{R.}$ RICHARD FALCKENBERG

ERLANGEN

as a mark of reverence and gratitude

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PART I.

BALGUY'S BIOGRAPHY.

Birth. *John Balguy*, a moral philosopher and an eminent divine of the Church of England, was born on the 12th of August 1686 at Sheffield in Yorkshire. He received the rudiments of his education from his father, *Thomas Balguy*, of whom little is known except that he was educated at Cambridge and that afterwards he was Master, for more than thirty years, of the Free Grammar School at Sheffield. He died in the year 1696, when his son *John*, was but ten years of age. A person named Mr. *Daubiz*, succeeded *Thomas Balguy* as Master of the Free School, and the fatherless *John* was kept under his tuition for a considerable time.

Education. In 1702 *Balguy* went to St. John's college Cambridge. At first he showed no signs of being a genuine student, but occupied his time in reading novels. In the third year of his university residence, he came across Livy, whose works greatly influenced him and proved the means of drawing his attention to serious studies. In the year 1706 he gained the degree of B. A., and in 1726 that of M. A.

A Teacher. After completing the degree of B. A. he went as a teacher to the Free Grammar School at Sheffield, which was probably still under the supervision of Mr. *Daubiz*. He does not seem to have been long here, for in the year 1708 he became a private tutor in the family of a person named Mr. *Banks*, where he remained about two years.

Enters the Church. In the year 1710 *Balguy* was admitted by the Archbishop of York, to Deacon's orders. In 1711 he was ordained priest by the same prelate. Also, in the same year *Balguy* received the honour of being admitted to the family of a gentleman

named Sir *Henry Liddle*, who secured for him a small preferment, Lamsby and Tanfield, in the County of Durham.

His marriage. In July 1715 he married a lady from Sheffield, who was about his own age, named *Sarah Broomhead*. By her he had only one son, *Thomas Balguy*, who became, through the influence of Bishop *Hoadly*, Archdeacon of Winchester. After his marriage *Balguy* left the Liddles and lived in his own house in the same neighbourhoop. This gave him the opportunity of continuing his friendship with them.

Becomes an author. In 1728, under the nom de plume *Silvius*, he entered upon his career as an author. To assume a false name was quite fashionable among authors at this period. The works published under the name "*Silvius*" were all written in defence of Bishop *Hoadly*. This was an undertaking which proved a real success to *Balguy*.

Settles in Northallerton. For in 1727—28 Bishop *Hoadly* made him Prebendary of the Church of Salisbury, and in 1729 he obtained through the influence of the Bishop the vicarage of Northallerton in Yorkshire, where he remained for the rest of his life. This secured to *Balguy* a living of £ 270 a year. His biographer says he could have further improved his position, but owing to his reserved nature "he neglected the usual methods of recommending himself to his superiors".[1] He had several invitations from influential persons, but declined to accept them.

His friends. *Balguy* had many distinguished friends. *Hoadly* and *Clarke* seemed to have been the most intimate. They were in his opinion the greatest living personalities. He was also well acquainted with *Butler*. One conspicuous trait in his character was his love for his friends. His real friends were as dear to him as his own self.

Death. His health and constitution were always feeble. In later years he was compelled to withdraw from all company, except that of a few friends he found at Harrogate, a place which he frequented during his holidays. On the 21st September, 1748, he died at the same place in the sixty third year of his life.

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[1] Biographia Britannica. See Article on *John Balguy*.

PART II.

BALGUY'S TIMES, WORKS, AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

Introduction. During the span of his active life, *John Balguy*, a spectator of, and a partaker in, the various stirring controversies — religious and ethical — of the early part of the eighteenth century, belonged to a party which may be called the moderate rationalists in religious and ethical opinions. Two factors — Deism and Sentimental Morality — seem to be operative in determining his position. Deism, on the one hand, represented the extreme position of religious rationalism. It was advocated by Lord *Herbert of Cherbury, Toland, Tindal,* and others. It upheld the notion of reason's sufficiency in all matters of religion, and regarded positive or revealed religion as superfluous. To *Balguy* this view ultimately denied any knowledge of God, and undermined man's responsibility. The sentimental moralists, on the other hand, in his opinion, verged on the other extreme of non-rationalism, and thereby, inverted the proper order of man's nature and his moral standard. They have deduced from this, he says, their erroneous conceptions of man and of God, and regarded them both as governed by brutal and blind instincts. To this class belonged *Shaftesbury, Hutcheson,* and many others. The moderate intellectualist aimed at a middle position, or a compromise. Reason is the supreme law of God and the universe. In its nature it is immutable and eternal; everything and everybody should be subsidiary to it and reveal its inherent characteristic, which is order or harmonious relation. Man was and is to be governed by this law. It was the standard of his conduct, but owing to the sentimental aspect of his nature he became the servant of sin, and was con-

sequently unable to recover his lost vigour of rational activity without the direct interference of God. The champions of this position were Dr. *Clarke* and to a certain extent, Bishop *Hoadly*. *Balguy* adopted their view.

These statements are not intended to be an exhaustive classification of the different writers and their opinions during this period, but we believe that they exemplify fairly accurately *Balguy's* conception of, and his attitude towards, his time.

Works. We find it convenient to classify his works as follows:—

(I). Those written in the defence of *Hoadly* under the nom de plume "*Silvius*".

(a.), "*Silvius*' Examination of certain doctrines lately taught and defended by the Rev. Mr. *Stebbing*," 1718.

(b.), "*Silvius*' Letter to The Rev. Dr. *Sherlock*," 1719.

(c.), "*Silvius*' Defence of a Dialogue between a Papist and a Protestant, in answer to the Rev. Mr. *Stebbing:* to which are added several remarks and observations upon that Author's manner of writing," 1720.

(II). Those written in the defence of Dr. *Clarke*. These are mostly ethical in character.

(a.), "The First Letter to a Deist," 1726; Second Edition 1730; Third Edition in 1732 and Fourth Edition 1734.

(b.), "The Foundation of Moral Goodness." (First Part) 1728; Second Edition 1733; Third Edition; Fourth Edition 1734.

(c.), "The Foundation of Moral Goodness" (Second Part) 1729. Second Edition (date not known); Third Edition 1734.

(III). His theological works.

(a.), "The Divine Rectitude, or a brief Enquiry concerning the Moral Perfections of the Deity, particularly in respect of Creation and Providence," 1730.

(b.), "An Essay on Redemption," 1741; Second Edition, Winchester, 1785.

(IV). His works against Deism.

(a.), "His Second Letter to a Deist," 1731; Second Edition 1734.
(b.), "The Law of Truth," 1733; Second Edition 1734.

All the above works, except those written in the defence of *Hoadly* and the "Essay on Redemption", were collected by *Balguy* in one volume, and were dedicated to *Hoadly*, London, 1734, 8vo.

Also, a posthumous collection of all the above works, except those written in the defence of *Hoadly*, were bound in one volume (date not known).

(V). A Volume of Sermons published by *Balguy* himself, 1738—39.

Several of his sermons were also published in the periodicals of his time.

Most of his sermons were collected and published in two posthumous volumes 1790.

For a fuller account of his sermons see Bibliography pages 67—69.

Works in the defence of *Hoadly*. *John Hoadly*, successively Bishop of Bangor, of Salisbury, and of Winchester — a divine of liberal and rational views — belonged to the party known as the Moderate, or the Low Churchmen. In the year 1716, he published his "Preservative against the Principles and Practice of Non-Jurors". Afterwards in the year 1717, he preached his famous sermon on the nature of the kingdom of *Christ*, before the King, which led to what is called, after the Bishop's name, the Bangorian controversy. In his political and ecclesiastical teaching he denied the "divine right" theory whether of priests or of kings. This denial, when applied to religion, is the outcome of Deism. In ecclesiastical quarters his teaching was keenly watched and felt, in their opinion he aimed at undermining one of the most sacred pillars of ecclesiasticism. He took away from the Clergy all superior and authoritative right over men's souls, and lowered the whole order to the ordinary level of human beings. Since the Church is the kingdom of *Christ*, no man, nor party of men, *Hoadly* maintained, had the power to prescribe laws and tyrannise over men's opinions in religious matters. *Christ* himself was the sole lawgiver of his kingdom and he alone was to be obeyed. It was

the duty of men to know, each for himself, the true meaning of *Christ's* commands — each man must strive for their meaning sincerely and with all his heart. Should he fail or err in his endeavour, the attempt would be moral inasmuch as it was truly sincere. Sincerity becomes a moral attitude incumbent on all *Christians*, for, by this attitude towards *Christ's* commands they are ranked among his subjects and become truly governed by him. This outburst of heterodoxy, on the part of *Hoadly*, sounded to the theological warriors of his time as a challenge. Dr. *Andrew Snape*, Provost of Eton College, *Thomas Sherlock*, Dean of Chichester, Dr. *Henry Stebbing* and others defended the cause and dignity of the Church against the traitor; Dr. *Sykes*, Dr. *Whitby*, *Balguy* and others enlisted under the banner of *Hoadly*. A battle of letters, pamphlets, treatises began. One day it became so furious that the great London traffic was brought to a standstill.

Works against Stebbing. *Balguy*, in his "Examination of Certain Doctrines lately taught and defended by the Rev. Mr. *Henry Stebbing*"; endeavours to establish "the innocency of error" in all cases where truth has been sincerely striven for. Like *Hoadly*, *Balguy* believes that "Erroneous opinion, and Wrong Practices, make no *Christian* the less acceptable in God's sight", if such be the outcome of a conscientious effort for truth.[1] Mr. *Stebbing* refutes this opinion. He grants that "sincerity" is commended by God, and that also such an attitude is rewarded in future life, but denies an entrance to the kingdon of Heaven to all but orthodox believers. *Balguy*, on the contrary, believes "sincerity" to be clearly promulgated in the Scripture as the one great condition of man's salvation, and that to possess this attitude is man's first religious duty.

Attached to this tract are two long articles, one on "Excommunication", and one on "Uninterrupted Succession". Mr. *Stebbing* stood for the excommunication of all persons of unorthodox opinions. In this article his views are refuted. Balguy says wrong opinions are no breach of the gospel covenant. Identity of opinions is not

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[1] *Silvius'* Examination of Certain Doctrines.

essential for the existence and wellbeing of a Church, for if such were the case, there would never have been a Church. Every Church member has a right to form his own opinions and also to express them. Excommunication is just, when indisputable cases of immorality occur or when a poisonous heresy which disturbs the normal equilibrium of the Church is adhered to. God alone is capable of passing ultimate judgment on men's attitude and conduct.

Concerning "Uninterrupted Succession", *Balguy* says, it was ordained by God to be uninterrupted, and that the cases of good dissenters are no breach of it.

Attacks *Sherlock.* After dealing a blow to *Stebbing, Balguy* directs his next to *Sherlock,* and writes his "*Silvius*' Letter to the Rev. Dr. *Sherlock*". The theme of this letter also is "sincerity", and its aim is to explain further this doctrine so as to render it capable of meeting the objection raised to it by *Sherlock.* The argument turns mostly upon the interpretation of passages from the Scripture. One new point is raised, that is, the relation of the doctrine to Roman Catholicism. It, says *Sherlock,* fostered and tolerated Romanism, and made all arguments valueless, when one endeavoured to convert a Papist. Mr. *Stebbing* after a time also propounded the same objection.

Attacks *Stebbing* once more. This accounts for *Balguy's* third tract in the defence of *Hoadly.* In "*Silvius* Defence of a Dialogue between a Papist and a Protestant", he says, "sincerity" when properly understood is no argument in favour of Papism. For a sincere heart is always open to receive new instruction and light and employs all available means in its effort for truth. What a stubborn Papist does, is to shut his eyes and thereby refuse all argument and light. Should he enter into an unprejudiced argument, unless his understanding be very much depraved, he would soon be convinced of the propriety and utility of a rational endeavour on his part to know the mind of Christ.

This tract produced an immediate reply from *Stebbing,* and *Balguy* prepared an answer to it, but its publication was prevented by *Clarke* and *Hoadly,* who begged of him to drop the argument

and retire from the controversy. This he obeyed, and abandoned all further attempts at defending *Hoadly*.

Ethical Works. After the Bangorian Controversy had ceased, *Balguy* turned his thoughts to moral and theological problems. His first contribution of this kind was his "Letter to a Deist".

The First Letter to a Deist. As far as we know there is no knowledge as to who this Deist was. *Balguy* received from a certain gentleman, who styles himself a Deist, an appeal for his opinion on "*Shaftesbury's* Characteristics" and this letter is his answer. The epistle commences with: "Sir! I have again pursued with fresh pleasure, and fresh concern, the volumes of the Characteristics which you were pleased to present me with some time ago, and I assure you, the condition of impartiality which you imposed on me has been punctually observed. I heartily wish the noble author had been as unprejudiced in writing as I am in reading."[1]

Aim of the work. The chief theme of this letter is the refutation of "the low and disadvantageous account" which *Shaftesbury* in his "Enquiry concerning Virtue" had given of religious motives as moral auxiliaries.[2] *Balguy* maintains that the consideration of rewards and punishments as moral motives or at least as moral auxiliaries in no way introduces elements detrimental to true morality.

Summary. The letter opens, on the one hand, with praise and admiration of, *Shaftesbury's* genius and style, but on the other hand, *Balguy* regrets that such a noble author has an antipathy towards the Clergy and that he sets such ignoble standards as "raillery" and "ridicule" as tests for right reason and truth. After marking a hasty disapproval of such "lamentable errors" as he calls them, he enters upon the principal theme of the letter, which is, the vindication of rewards and punishments as moral auxiliaries. *Shaftesbury*, he says, in his "Enquiry concerning Virtue" carries the notion of disinterested moral motives too far. He himself, by no means approves of that system which is based on self interest.

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[1] p. 2. 3rd Edition.
[2] p. 4. 3rd Edition.

For the conduct of God, which is to be man's pattern, is not determined by self-seeking motives. The world was not created that he might be happier. His conduct is always determined by what is right. The more our actions resemble those of God, the more virtuous they are. When the motive to any action is tinged with self interest, so much is to be subtracted from the moral worth of that action. The kind of self interest which *Balguy* speaks of here is that which seeks the various goods of this world. But, he says there is also another kind, which is the desire for happiness in a future world. This kind, in the first place, is in harmony with real benevolence, nay, even more, it is a condition of benevolence. Those who are guided by meditations on a blessed immortality display a perfect example of real benevolence. For by seeking happiness in the next world they get "peace and tranquility of mind", and are always pleasant and loving towards one another. In other words regard for a future existence contributes to form that "goodness of temper" which according to *Shaftesbury* is indispensable to a healthy benevolence. To reflect upon the fact that we are to dwell together for ever in a world to come ought to endear us to one another in this world and induce us to suffer for each other and bear the burdens of this world. Take away from the mind the thought of a blessed immortality and all these noble social sentiments will be inverted. Instead of love, joy and generosity, we shall find hatred, grief and selfishness; that is, the very opposite of that "goodness of temper" required by *Shaftesbury*. *Hence*, *Balguy* concludes that regard for a future existence rather than destroying benevolence is a condition of it. Secondly the ignorant and sinful condition of man requires such inducements. Those who have led a sinful life have impaired their reason and are unable to conceive (perceive) the beauty and the intrinsic quality of virtue. God intended the revelation of future rewards and punishments to be an effective means of counteracting the effects of a sinful career, and thereby of awakening reflection which should end in drawing men to do their duty, that is, to strive after virtue for its own sake. Thirdly, the idea of a blessed immortality was a great support to those who suffered and died for their convictions and their endeavours to elevate humanity. But

for such considerations and convictions history would have no martyrs to record. This letter closes with an appeal to the Deist to undertake an unprejudiced study of the New Testament. For were he to do so, he would be convinced that it contains the most excellent benevolence taught and exemplified.

The First Part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness. *Balguy's* "Foundation of Moral Goodness" (First Part) was written in the defence of Dr. *Clarke* against *Hutcheson*. *Hunt*[1] represents *Shaftesbury* as the author attacked in this treatise. Such a view is evidently erroneous,[2] for this work is an exclusive attack on *Hutcheson's* moral theory, and only applies to *Shaftesbury* in as much as *Hutcheson* is his disciple. Witness its opening words: "The ingenious Author of the 'Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue', has written both his Books with so good a Design, is everywhere so instructive and entertaining, and discovers upon all Occasions such a fund of good Nature, as well as good Sense, that I find myself more inclined to join with the Publick in his just Praise, than offer any Objections against his Performance. And indeed it is not without Pain, that I attempt to point out some Particulars wherein I apprehend he has erred."[3] Throughout the whole Essay *Balguy* refers exclusively to *Hutcheson*.

Its aim. In this work (also in the second part of his "Foundation of Moral Goodness"), *Balguy*, sets down his fundamental conception of morals. His position is exactly that of Dr. *Clarke:* Morality must be based upon "the eternal and immutable relations of things". Though *Balguy's* position is like that of Dr. *Clarke*, yet, the end he has in view, that is, the refutation of *Hutcheson's* moral theory, greatly modifies the temper and contents of his work; for unlike *Clarke* he deals not with man's egoistic propensities and the legislative theory propounded by *Hobbes* as their practical solution, but rather with his benevolent instincts and the superiority of his reason over them. Keeping this point of view in mind we believe *Balguy* makes a great

[1] *Hunt*, "History of Religious Thought in England".

[2] See the Article on *Balguy* in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

[3] p. 41. 4th Edition. See *Balguys* Tracts.

effort, the first in our opinion, on the part of the British Intellectualists, to overthrow the sentimental theory of morals. This he endeavours to accomplish by showing that sentiments are not wholly antagonistic to reason, for they may be brought into harmonious relation with it, without even losing their peculiar nature. Such is the case if they execute its commands as being its inferiors. We have, therefore, in this work, an effort, on the one hand, to establish the intellectual nature of God and man as the basis of morality, and on the other hand, to explain the function of sensibility in relation to such a conception.

Summary. As this work will be fully considered in treating of *Balguy's* ethical thought, we shall only give a broad outline of it here. To establish morality, he says, upon instincts, as *Hutcheson* does, has a five-fold disadvantage. First, it makes virtue arbitrary and positive in its nature. It is arbitrary because God can alter and even invert our present instincts, it is positive because instincts (in relation to man's will) are defined and constant in their nature. They influence the will despotically, as it were, from the outside, and thereby destroy freedom which is an essential condition of morality. Secondly, it follows that should any man be without moral instincts he would be, in spite of his reason and liberty of choice, incapable of performing the least moral action. Thirdly, on this foundation brutes must come under the category of moral beings. Fourthly, it follows that the stronger an affection is, the more moral is the action propagated by it, and since these are found in both egoistic and filial dispositions, *Hutcheson's* system becomes self contradictory. Fifthly, "Virtue is depreciated and depraved by so ignoble an original".[1] It is based upon the most unsuitable and unworthy strata in human nature. These difficulties, says *Balguy*, are insurmountable on *Hutcheson's* moral conception, and can only be avoided by placing virtue upon reason, which is the highest principle of man's nature. The same objections hold good also concerning his "moral sense", which becomes useless when the true nature of virtue and reason is properly understood. By establishing virtue, on the

[1] 4th Edition. p. 57. See *Balguy's* Tracts.

other hand, on its proper foundation, that is, on "the reasons of things", its immutable and eternal nature rises into prominence. Morality on such a foundation is, and ought to be, ranked among the sciences and regarded as a species of truth. It can, therefore, be taught and developed like any other true science. The inducement to its performance arises not from man's sentiments, but from his rational nature. The motto should be: "Be virtuous for virtue's sake". This by no means does away with instincts. They were given us by God to be moral auxiliaries, capacities which enable them to retain their nature in a healthy condition.

The second part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness. The second part of the "Foundation of Moral Goodness" is a further statement of what is contained in the first part. According to popular opinion, *Balguy* was induced to undertake this further explanation by a certain Lord *Lacy*. An anonymous person who had read, unconvinced, the first part of the "Foundation of Moral Goodness", sent *Balguy* a set of forty questions on what he considered fallacies in the work.[1] *Balguy* gives a careful answer to each question. This combination of questions and answers makes up what is called "The Second part of the Foundation of Moral Goodness".

Contents. The work naturally does not cover the whole ground covered by the first part. It deals mostly with the relation of sentiment to motive. This anonymous inquirer fails to grasp the conception of "virtue, for virtue's sake", but believes sentiment to be prior to all rational determination and virtuous pursuit.

His works on Theology. *Balguy's* next contributions to literature are more theological than ethical in their character. In his "Divine Rectitude" and in his "Essay on Redemption" he undertakes to further apply and exemplify the principle of rectitude (i. e. the fitness of things) by showing it to be always the principle which underlies God's conduct. His intention was to construct a system of theology based upon the said principle. But his hopes were never fully realised. The two works

[1] See *Balguy's* Biography. Biographia Britannica.

mentioned above, may be said to comprise about threefourths of his original plan. The remaining portion, "An Essay on Immortality", was never written. But this defect, to a certain extent, is made good by two sermons[1] that he composed on the subject. These works are not, like those we have already noticed, the outcome of any debate with any particular person or persons, but are rather the embodiment of his reflections and attitude towards the theological thought of his time. For instance, one of the most interesting questions debated dealt with "the first spring of action in the Deity".[2] A divine named *Grove* said it was wisdom, and another named *Bayes* argued in favour of benevolence, while *Balguy*, again, contended that rectitude is the governing principle of God. Another perplexing question was that concerning the doctrine of redemption. *Sykes*, *Stillingfleet*, and several other divines had all their own points of view regarding this subject. Others again, such as *Tindal*, contended that the whole doctrine was incompatible with divine justice and would not accept it. *Balguy* is dissatisfied with all the notions of contemporary divines and thinks there is no other satisfactory way of explaining the doctrine than according to the principle of rectitude.

The Divine Rectitude. Summary. The essay on "The Divine Rectitude" opens by drawing attention to the various ways in which the character of God is inferred. Men when contemplating the divine character, he says, magnify either their sentiments or ideas. The result is an anthropomorphic conception of God. The only alternative which avoids such an error is one of a purely logical conception. God always acts logically (i. e. according to the fitness of things). If the divine conduct, as shewn in creation, in providence, in the redemption of mankind, and in the gift of immortality, be examined from such a point of view it becomes a logical whole, and conversely, the fact that it becomes a coherent whole testifies that such a way of explaining is the right one.

We pass on, therefore, to show how *Balguy* applies this principle to the divine conduct and, thereby, how he thinks it verifies itself.

[1] Entitled: Natural and Moral Proofs of a Future state.

[2] See *Balguy's* Biography. Biographia Britannica.

Creation. In Creation God had two distinct ends in view. These were the "distribution of happiness" and the "manifestation of order". These ends would be altogether impossible on any other conception except the one which regards the universe as made up of innumerable parts logically related to one another.

Providence. *Balguy* is fully aware that these statements will be severely questioned, for God in his providence appears to many as being an example of an unjust and stupid governor, who suffers mankind to be buffeted and tortured. He, therefore, admits that these ends, though they ought not to conflict with one another, nevertheless do so, and in the sight of men sometimes disappear. Instead of order and happiness there appear to exist but misery and chaos. All this is due to man's own folly. He abused his freedom and became the bondman of sin. Yet, on the other hand, he says, all this has but an appearance of disorder and misery which is only temporal. Evil, he says, is of two kinds, "apparent" and "real". "Apparent evil" is but a mode of discipline employed by God in order to restore men to virtuous conduct. "Apparent evil", therefore, is contrary in no way to order and happiness, for it is used as a means to bring about such ends. "Real evil" again aims directly at the inversion of God's designs. If it could it would reduce the universe to chaos, and happiness to misery. To cope with the effects of such an evil God found it necessary to reveal a plan of salvation through Christ, and to assure mankind that the soul shall dwell for ever in another world, where all evil, either real or apparent, will be amended. What has been regarded as a discord in the world of time, therefore, will be converted into concord in the here-after.

Redemption. *Balguy*, in his "Essay on Redemption", understands Tindal and others to regard the salvation of mankind through *Christ* as utterly incompatible with divine justice. No wonder such objections arise when men like *Sykes* explain the doctrine as a mere Jewish mode of expressing the divine forgiveness, or when others regard the guiltless *Christ* to have suffered and died on behalf of man's sin. The doctrine can be satisfactorily explained to all parties, he says, on the principle he contends for, that is, the fitness of things.

To succeed in explaining it thus, great caution must be taken not to use any terms which are incompatible with the notion of absolute justice. Whole passages of Scripture, in some cases, have to be interpreted figuratively.

Redemption, when properly defined, means "the deliverence from the power and punishment of sin by the meritorious sufferings of Jesus Christ". When thus defined the doctrine of redemption is freed from the barbaric idea of giving satisfaction to God and from the contention that Christ acted as a substitute for the punishment due to man. The transferring of guilt from one person to another is impossible and therefore, vicarious punishment is impossible. Christ's sufferings were meritorious, and because he suffered on behalf of mankind they can be called vicarious sufferings. In a word they were "premial" and not "penal". As his sufferings were meritorious he has procured the favour of God and the indemnity of sinners, and has thus revealed a means to secure mankind from the power and punishment of sin, that is, from the effects of what *Balguy* calls "real evil".

Immortality. But the effects of "real evil" on mankind cannot be wholly eradicated in this world. To restore the lost harmony, the soul must be immortal. The chaotic aspect and the miserable condition of this world is an argument, from the fitness of the case, for the immortality of the soul. For if it is not immortal then it ends its career in a world which to all appearance is full of misery and disorder. Not only is such an idea absurd, but also it reflects upon the just character of God. For he must be either an unjust, unmerciful and cruel ruler, else he would not have allowed men to be buffeted and tortured during their short span of life, or, he has been defeated by some other power in carrying out his designed purpose, and is, therefore, helpless to aid his miserable creatures. No, neither of these postulates can be right. To think and to speak thus of the almighty and perfect God would be blasphemy. The conclusion is then, that the soul is immortal and that the designed ends of God will be fully realised in the world to come.

Also, revelation and the nature of the soul itself, proves it to be immortal.

His works against Deism. In all his writings, theological and otherwise, *Balguy* does not fail, when opportunity arises, to assail Deism. But besides indirectly attacking the school he has also directly attacked it. He wrote his "Second Letter to a Deist" against *Tindal's* "Christianity as old as the Creation" (1730), and his "Law of Truth" against the principles of Deism in general.

The Second Letter to a Deist. "The Second Letter to a Deist" was probably written tho the same person as the first. This anonymous deist had asked *Balguy* whether the arguments of *Tindal*, particularly those against Dr. *Clarke*, did not prove revelation to be needless. The principal queries of the essay, and their answers are as follows: In the first place, *Balguy* is asked: Is not "the light of nature" as explained by *Tindal* a sufficient guide of men's conduct, and therefore, is not revelation superfluous? Also, he asks has Dr. *Clarke* not admitted the sufficiency of such a light, and yet contends revelation to be necessary? Does *Clarke* thereby not contradict himself? *Balguy* answers that *Tindal* had grossly misunderstood Dr. *Clarke*. For he had failed to notice the distinction the Doctor had made between "the law of Nature", which is absolute and perfect, and "the light of Nature" whose power is in proportion to the purity of man's reason. The Doctor had never cast a slur on "the law of Nature", as such, but had always emphasised its absolute and perfect character, and also its sufficiency to guide anyone who was able to conceive it. At the same time, he had emphasised the deterioration that had taken place, through sin, in man's reason, and which rendered him incapable, without help, of conceiving the all perfect law. To regard such propositions as contradictory, says *Balguy*, is absurd. Secondly, is *Tindal* not right when he says that it is an insult to human nature and to its Creator to represent its perfect embodiment in one pair alone? *Balguy* says, that human beings had no argument for claiming the possession of a perfect nature. When our first parents received such a nature, it was not because God was obliged to bestow it upon them, but they received it rather as a token of his goodwill. The present condition of human nature is far below the standard possessed by our

first parents, but its deterioration is entirely due to man's disobedience. Thirdly, has not *Tindal* shown that it is incompatible with God's justice and love to favour a small class of people with the secrets of his character and the way of their salvation, while leaving thousands of human beings to grope in darkness and perish? No, says *Balguy*, for to treat every man, or class of men, differently is no argument against God's rectitude and love, but rather an argument confirming it. Once the principle of "the fitness of things" is thoroughly grasped it becomes clear that the irregular distribution of God's goods is a necessity. A better example of this can nowhere be found than that supplied by his irregular distribution of natural goods. No one regards such a distribution as a slur on God's just character, but rather regards it as the only manner of exemplifying the perfection of his works. Logically the same irregularity is equally justifiable in his distribution of spiritual goods. Fourthly, *Tindal* says that ultimately Christianity and Deism are the same. Is he not right? No! for Christianity is the manifestation of God's will through Jesus Christ and Deism is the knowledge of his will by means of reason. *Balguy* brings this letter to a close by refuting *Tindal's* view that rewards and punishments involve selfish elements which are detrimental to true morality. For, says he, considering the depravity of man's reason, it is evident that he stands in need of help.

The Law of Truth. The essay styled "The Law of Truth" opens with a long preface reinstating the principles expounded in the essay on "The Divine Rectitude". We consider it therefore unnecessary to repeat them here. *Hence*, we pass over the preface and consider the essay itself.

"The Law of Truth" possesses at least two aspects, a rational aspect and a revealed aspect. These are the means by which the nature of truth and God can be known. This fact has been often overlooked by various writers. Some enthusiastically contend that reason is sufficient in itself for the purpose, while others maintain that the whole nature of truth is experienced by a blind belief in revelation. The advocates of either of these contentions, because of their onesidedness are wrong. Both aspects, owing to the nature

of things, are absolutely necessary. Their inter-dependence may be explained as follows: In the first place, truth as it is known by reason is the one universal and absolute foundation of everything. In contemplating it we become aware and are convinced of its self-obligatory nature. Nothing but truth has absolute authority. It derives its authority from nowhere outside of its own nature, while anything which claims any pretence to authority must receive such a mandate from truth before it can be real. In the second place, religion — natural or revealed — since it is based upon truth, possesses all the imperativeness or obligation of truth itself. Hence the obligations of revealed religion, as such, have the same claim upon men as those of natural religion, as such. They are both self-obligatory. Hence, in the third place. since natural religion and revelation both rest on the same foundation, their interests and purposes cannot be antagonistic. But, on the contrary, rather than weakening or destroying each other, they supplement each other's defects and thereby furnish an example of a complete religion — a religion that meets all the needs of humanity, based upon the most impregnable foundation.

Sermons. During the first four years of his preferment, *Balguy* wrote a new sermon every week, and continued the habit more or less regularly throughout his lifetime. At one time he committed 250 of them to the flames so as not to tempt his son to lead an indolent life by using them, and, thereby, he induced him to follow his own industrious example.

His sermons deal mostly with the controversial topics of the day. For an account of their various subjects see Bibliography pages: 67, 68, 69.

According to *Balguy's* biographer[1] his sermons ought to be regarded among the best preached in the English language.

THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.

External features. *Balguy* does not seem to have aimed at any special style of composition. His mind is always occupied with the

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[1] *Thomas Balguy.* See Biographia Britannica.

problem he expounds, and the language he employs is to him of secondary importance. Being an intellectualist he moves somewhat heavily, as if he is half conscious of the burden of his conceptions. When compared with Clarke he may be called a fairly lucid writer. He is not guilty of long sentences covering half a page, with the minimum of thought and the maximum of confusion, nor is he guilty of extravagant use of mathematical illustrations; but in spite of his being free from these defects of his master, he cannot claim to be unambiguous. It is difficult, almost impossible, at times to know his exact meaning. Even after a careful reading of a treatise whole sentences remain dark and light only dawns by bringing one work to explain the other. He continually repeats his arguments; this being probably due to his intense convictions and to his desire to impress them upon others. His employment of philosophical terms also is very loose.

His lack of literary art. A remark of his biographer[1] may be mentioned here. He believes that the time spent by *Balguy* in reading romances during the first two years of his residence at Oxford was not altogether unprofitable, as *Balguy* himself maintained; for they may have had the effect of giving vigour to his imagination and were therefore beneficial to his literary efforts. But this remark seems to us to be groundless. What is really characteristic of *Balguy's* writings is the lack of imaginative vigour — the lack of poetical colouring and fine rhetoric. In the choice and use of his illustrations he often displays very inferior taste. Some are really puerile and below the dignity of any person claiming to himself the character of a philosopher. For instance, notice the following extracts from an argument of his, proving the necessity and use of revealed religion:

"Let us suppose Men to enjoy naturally all the Light that he allows for the Direction of their Conduct: might they not nevertheless go astray, and want to be reduced? In clear Daylight, and open Sunshine, may not a Traveller take a wrong Road; and wander on till he bewilder himself? Perhaps some amusing

[1] *Thomas Balguy.* See Biographia Britannica.

Object catches his Eye, and tempts him aside. Perhaps it detains him there; and so far engages his Mind, as to make him forget both his Road and his Journey. Is all Advice, all Assistance, in such a Case needless? Is it not, on the contrary, very desirable; that some Friend wiser than himself, should providentially interpose to awaken and admonish him; or, leading him gently by the Hand, bring him back into the Way from whence he has erred? Should he moreover, to prevent the like Excursions for the future, assure him, that the Affair he is going about is of infinitely greater Consequence than he imagined; and that his Welfare entirely depends on his Diligence and Expedition. Should he press him with the greatest Earnestness to pursue his Journey vigorously and without Deviation or Trifling; and to encourage him the more effectually, should he promise him his Company and Assistance to the far end; and undertake, if he were not wanting to himself, to carry him through all Difficulties that he might happen to meet with; Would such Offices as these be useless; or such Offers contemptible? If this Traveller should refuse the Aid of such a Friend, and reject his kind Proposals; if he should tell him, that he had Light enough upon his Hands, and that he knew his Road and his Business; and therefore was determined not to go back with him; but to take his own Time, and his own Measures; if he should further declare, that he thought him too officious; and that he had no occasion either for his Help, or his Counsel; would not anyone who knew the Case, conclude that Man doubly lost; and that he was out of his Wits, as well as out of his Way?"[1]

Again:

"If any Philosopher happened to wander never so widely, or to be even quite lost; could the Rules of Morality, the Reasons and Relations of Things, be lost with him? Whatever Accidents or Misfortunes he might meet with in the wide Sea; could Truth, eternal Truth, be sunk or ship-wrecked? To speak plainly, the Law of Nature, for that very Reason, because it is unchangeable,

[1] The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. pp. 279—80.

neither has nor can have any Dependence on Human Understandings. But why should it seem strange, that Men should wander in the wide Sea, without Revelation; when we find they still wander there, even with it? Is it not much stranger, that in these Days, Men should fail without the Compass; and venture, at the same time, to be every Man his own Pilot? None of the ancient Philosophers could wander more widely, more wilfully, more desperately, than this very Author,[1] who despising the Lights of Heaven trusts all to his own Arm, and his own Rudder; and that upon a very unsound, and infirm Bottom."[2]

Further, no one can regard the following as an example of the highest taste:

"Since Men have, and always had, this perfect Law (law of nature); what Occasion for Prophets and Revelation? I answer, as I did before, that supposing this perfect Law perfectly known; which was not the Case; still they had the same Occasion for Prophets and Revelation, that they have for Physicians and Medicines. Mankind had broken their Constitution, contracted very ill Habits, and laboured under a Complication of Distempers. Their Vitals were touched, and they were become even sick unto Death."[3]

These examples have been taken from his "Second Letter to a Deist", which in our opinion is his best work from a literary point of view, and yet that which possesses the least merit from a logical standpoint. His "First Letter to a Deist" and his tracts on "Sincerity" also belong to this class. On the whole the external features or style of his works attract no one; their charm mostly lies in their inner beauty.

The Inner features of his Works. *Balguy*, though deficient in the architectonic grandeur of composition is nevertheless able to impress upon the reader that what he writes is a direct manifestation of his convictions and personality.

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[1] Tindal.

[2] The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. p. 309.

[3] The Second Letter to a Deist. 2nd Edition. pp. 321—22.

A better example of an internal warmth permeating a man's theoretical notions can not easily be found. This proportionate combination of sentiment and logic has indeed its own peculiar charm. Those sentences of his which are stiff and gloomy when isolated from their context receive new life when examined in their excogitative setting. No one can fail to feel the thrill of the sincerity of some of his reasoned out paragraphs. They vibrate with the emotions of a soul in search for truth. Their inward light beams forth with intensity, overpowers our sentiments and demands our respect.

His Spirit. In a tract[1] issued to enumerate the authors and works of the "Bangorian Controversy" the gentlemess of *Balguy's* spirit is pointed out as compared with the harshness of other writers during this strife. The pamphlets published on this occasion were full of personal enmity and imputations. "Never was such a waste of human passion," says *Leslie Stephen.*[2] But *Balguy* is elevated by the author of this tract to the higher plane of an unprejudiced critic. Comparing his writings with those of others at this time, he deserves praise for keeping his anger and passion under control, or rather, deserves praise for not being overwhelmed and swayed by irrational and base temper. But to say that he never showed anger and hatred during this strife would be totally wrong. In his letter to Dr. *Sherlock* he is roused to a pitch of anger which bursts out so furiously that it verges almost on indecency. Another proof of his turbulent spirit on this occasion is given us by his biographer who relates the trouble *Hoadly* and *Clarke* had had in pursuading him from taking further part in the controversy.[3] On other occasions also, evidences can be found of *Balguy* being greatly prejudiced. In his "Second Letter to a Deist" there is a certain tone of impatience, tinged with contempt, against the author of "Christianity as old as the Creation". It is, he says, "a pompous book", "a show", "a mixture of mire

[1] Biographical and Literary Tract. London 1782. 4rd British Museum. 132. C. 4.

[2] English Thought in the 18th Century. Vol. II. p. 157.

[3] See above p. 7.

and mud", "a collection of data which proves nothing", "a compiled example of empty exclamations". These are no utterances of a "gentle spirit" nor of an unbiassed mind.

But yet, we find a strong vein of "gentle spirit" running through his works especially in those that are not involved in furious controversy. In his "First Letter to a Deist" and his "Foundation of Moral Goodness" he goes out of the way to apologise for the position he has taken against the authors whom he refutes in these works.[1] They are to him master writers with the very best intentions, and he deeply laments the ill fortune of their opinion being false, or at any rate contrary to his own and that of Dr. *Clarke*. In the most gentlemanly spirit, and in spite of a desire to be silent, he refutes their opinions. For, he says,[2] he is induced by certain convictions to defend the honour and dignity of virtue and truth.

These examples disclose the inward characteristics of his works, which though not altogether faultless, yet when compared with their external features cast somewhat pleasant and attractive rays — rays that are caused by a pure, unhidden soul.

His Conception of style inferred. *Balguy's* conception of literary style may be inferred from his remarks on the beautiful.[3] The beautiful he maintains is a species of truth and it therefore consists of logical relations. Hence, we may justly say that to him any literary production consistent with itself is a feat of considerable value. When he examines any work from the point of view of its style or character he dwells on the emotions or the sentiments of the author rather than on the form of their expression or crystallization. Whether an author is sincere or insincere, consistent or inconsistent seems to be the main point on which *Balguy* dwells when treating of any work as a literary composition.

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[1] See their opening pages.

[2] See the opening pages of "The Foundation of Moral Goodness".

[3] "The Foundation of Moral of Goodness". 4th Edition. p. 62. See also below p. 34.

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LEBENSLAUF.

Ich bin geboren am 22. November 1877 als Sohn des Kapitäns *Evan Jones* und dessen Frau *Ellen* geb. *Davies* zu Glasfryn Uchaf. Chwilog. Sowohl ich wie mein Vater gehören der presbyterischen Kirche an und besitzen die englische Staatsangehörigkeit.

Vor meinem Universitätsstudium genoß ich die folgende Ausbildung: Vom fünften bis sechzehnten Jahre besuchte ich die Board School, welche der deutschen Elementarschule gleichsteht. Darauf studierte ich vier Jahre den Beruf eines Landmessers (Civil Eningeer) und Architekten. Im Alter von zwanzig Jahren trat ich in eine Welsh Prespyterian Denominational School in Clynnog Fawr ein. Auf dieser bestand ich im Jahre 1899 mein Examen und wurde in den Welsh Presbyterian Calender eingetragen. Darauf begann ich mein Universitätsstudium. Zuerst besuchte ich die Universität von Wales, davon zwei Jahre das College von Cardiff und ein Jahr das College von Aberystwyth. Während dieser drei Jahre beschäftigte ich mich hauptsächlich mit philosophischen Fächern, nebenbei auch mit Naturwissenschaften. Im Jahre 1904 (Winter-Semester) begann ich dann meine philosophischen Studien in Deutschland, und zwar ein Semester in Marburg, und die übrige Zeit in Erlangen (vier Semester).

Printed by Albert Limbach, Ltd., Brunswick (Germany).